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Abstract This paper provides an overview of the enor-
mous challenge of meeting future energy demand in an
environmentally responsible manner. A portfolio approach
is required, which must include more solar, wind, hydro,
bio and marine energy wherever sensible, and demand
reduction (through better planning, especially in the
world’s expanding cities), increased efficiency, more
nuclear power, and (if feasible, safe and economically
competitive) carbon capture and storage. In the longer
term, the world will need much more solar power,
advanced nuclear fission, and fusion power—if it can be
made to work reliably and competitively. The policy pri-
ority is to put a (high) price on carbon in the context of a
global agreement (through a tax, or cap and trade with a
floor price to provide certainty for investors), which is
easily said, but very hard to do.
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Introduction
The biggest challenge of the twenty-first century is to
provide sufficient food, water, and energy to allow every-
one on the planet to live decent lives in decent environ-
ments, in the face of rising population, the threat of climate
change, and (sooner or later) declining fossil fuels. Provi-
sion of sufficient energy is a necessary (but not sufficient)
means to meet the overall challenge.
The world is using energy at a rate of 2.4 kW per per-
son: that is the equivalent of 24 old-fashioned 100 W
incandescent light bulbs burning continuously for every
man woman and child on the planet. Average use per
person is 10.4 kW in the USA while it is only 0.21 in
Bangladesh. The average is 4.6 kW in the UK and in the
Middle East as a whole, although it is much higher in the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. For everyone
to use energy at the same rate as the average person in the
UK or the Middle East, total energy consumption would
have to go up 1.9-fold today, or 2.4-fold when the popu-
lation reaches 9 billion. This is probably impossible so
changes in behaviour and expectations will be necessary.
Some 78 % of the world’s primary energy is currently
generated by burning fossil fuels (oil, coal, gas) which is
causing potentially catastrophic climate change, and hor-
rendous pollution, and is unsustainable as they won’t last
forever. The rest (in thermal equivalent terms) is provided
by: burning combustible renewables and waste—10 %;
hydropower—5.8 %; nuclear power—4.7 %; geother-
mal ? solar ? wind ? marine power—1.2 %. The popu-
lar hope that the last category might replace fossil fuels
must be tempered by the realisation that to do so its con-
tribution would have to increase by a factor of 65, and the
increase would have to be even greater in the future
assuming world consumption continues to grow, driven by
(very welcome) economic development in China, Africa
and India.
The scale of the challenge is also shown by the Inter-
national Energy Agency’s 2011 ‘new policies scenario’.
According to this scenario, which assumes the successful
implementation of all agreed national policies and
announced commitments designed to save energy and
reduce use of fossil fuels, energy use will increase 33 % in
the period 2010–2035, while the use of fossil fuels will
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increase 23 % (the increases come almost entirely from
non-OECD countries). Although this falls far short of
expectations, and of what is needed to temper climate
change, the scenario requires very demanding measures,
such as a 70 % increase in nuclear power and 60 % more
hydropower (think of the civil engineering). Most com-
mentators anticipate larger increases in energy use, e.g. the
BP Energy Outlook 2030 (published in early 2012), which
is based on BP judgement of what will actually happen and
is not a business as usual extrapolation, projects a 39 %
increase by the earlier date 2030, with fossil fuels up 31 %.
Future of fossil fuels
There is said to be a Saudi saying: ‘‘My father rode a
camel. I drive a car. My son flies a plane. His son will ride
a camel’’. Could this be true?
It is observed, and understood, that conventional oil
production in a given region peaks when roughly half the
primordial endowment of extractable oil has been produced.
Predictions of when world oil production will peak depend
on estimates of the primordial endowment and assumptions
about how much it will be economic to extract, which in
turn depend on assumptions about developments in tech-
nology and the oil price. A 2009 literature review by the UK
Energy Research Centre concluded that the peak ‘is likely
to occur before 2030’ and that there is a ‘significant risk’
that it will occur before 2020.
But there is plenty of oil in unconventional places (e.g.
the deep ocean off Brazil and the arctic) and lots of
unconventional oil (heavy oil, tight/shale oil, oil from oil
shale or tar sands). Without significant technological develop-
ments, exploitation of most of these reserves will however
be expensive and would be difficult to expand fast enough
to compensate for an early peak in conventional oil pro-
duction. The debate on the effect this will have on oil
prices continues. Confidence in continued high prices
would presumably lead to increased investments in turning
coal and gas into oil.
There is plenty of coal and gas. According to the IEA,
global coal reserves that are economically recoverable with
current technology are enough for 150 years with current
use, while there is enough recoverable gas for some
125 years, which potential unconventional resources could
increase to 250 years. The fracking/shale gas revolution in
the USA has had a dramatic effect on the world gas market,
e.g. by freeing up liquefied natural gas (previously destined
for the US) from Qatar, which in 2011 provided 27 % of
the UK’s gas, up from less than 0.15 % in 2008, and is a
major contributor in the Far East. It is unclear, however,
whether the expanding rate of production of shale gas is
sustainable, and how much is really going to be accessible.
Climate change and carbon capture and storage
Climate scientists tell us that it would take thousands of years
for the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere to drop to
preindustrial levels were carbon emissions to stop abruptly.
It follows that on time scales shorter than a thousand years, it
is the cumulative emission of carbon-dioxide that drives
climate change—not the rate of emission. Consequently, as
long as power stations and certain large industrial plants
continue to burn fossil fuels, the only measure that it is
available to prevent the produced carbon dioxide driving
additional climate change is to capture and bury as much as
possible underground, where it must stay for thousands of
years if the whole exercise is to have any point.
It is therefore very important to develop carbon capture
and storage (CCS), which has not yet been demonstrated in a
complete large-scale system, and to understand better what it
will cost, and how long the carbon will stay underground in
different geological conditions. CCS is likely to be expensive,
and whether—assuming it is feasible—it should then be
deployed on a large scale will depend on the cost in com-
parison to alternative low carbon energy sources (unless the
public is willing to pay for these alternatives, and/or pay over
the odds for CCS, it would seem likely that most of the carbon
in the world’s remaining ‘cheap’ fossil fuels will be emitted
into the atmosphere on a time scale of a (few) hundred years,
with severe consequences for the climate).
Necessary actions
In addition to developing CCS (and rolling it out on a large
scale, if it this is feasible, safe and affordable), meeting the
energy challenge requires:
• Reducing energy use/improving efficiency, which can
have a large impact and save a lot of money, as
discussed further below, but is unlikely to do more than
curb the rising growth in global energy, which is driven
by rising living standards in the developing world.
• Developing and expanding low carbon energy sources;
we need everything we can sensibly get, but I will
argue that without major contributions from solar and/
or nuclear (fission and/or fusion) it will not be possible
to replace the 14 TW currently provided by fossil fuels.
• Devising economic tools and ensuring the political will
to make the above happen.
Use of energy, demand reduction and energy efficiency
Globally, energy use is shared: 31 % industry, 31 %
transport, 27 % residential buildings, 9 % commerce and
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public service, 2 % agriculture, forestry and fisheries,
according to the Internal Energy Agency. Private use (in
transport ? buildings) is large, so although what we each
do individually does not matter, what we do collectively is
enormously important.
There is huge scope for reducing demand by, for
example, designing buildings to make good use of natural
light, and planning cities to encourage walking, bicycling
or use of public transport. There are major opportunities in
rapidly developing countries, where low-carbon develop-
ment paths should be adopted as early as possible in
planning expanding transport systems and cities (once a
city ends up like Phoenix, going back is next to impossi-
ble). Changes in planning and procurement by cities and
communities, designed to optimise energy use and reduce
CO2 emissions, are increasingly important drivers of
demand and efficiency.
Managing demand and matching multiple sources of
supply and demand through a smart grid (which collects
information on grid conditions, use and costs across a large
network, with multiple connections, and bidirectional
flows) is becoming increasingly important. This should
lead to more efficient energy use and reduce costs by
lowering peak demand on the grid, and will be necessary
when the penetration of intermittent sources (wind, solar)
increases to much above the 20 % level.
Big efficiency gains are possible, from (e.g.) improved
building insulation, more efficient lighting (which con-
sumes 19 % of the world’s electricity), and more efficient
internal combustion engines or moving to hybrids or
electric cars. Energy consumption per unit of GDP has
been falling (in the UK it is now 40 % of the 1971 level)
but GDP has been rising faster. Much more could be done
while saving a lot of money (according to McKinsey, US
CO2 emissions could be reduced by nearly 20 % by actions
which would all save money). It’s not happening as fast
might be expected because of:
• The ‘rebound effect’—greater efficiency can lead to
greater use. Similarly, trying to reduce demand by
telling people how to save money and energy, e.g. by
adjusting the thermostat, may lead them to conclude
that they can afford to use more.
• Affluence in the developed world. Most of us don’t care
about relatively small savings, even if we know that
collectively they could have a large effect—we need to
be compelled to make them by regulations, e.g. on
building construction and the performance of cars.
• Lack of capital in parts of the developing world, which
may inhibit investment in efficient devices and solu-
tions even if the pay-back time is short.
Reducing demand and improving efficiency are imper-
ative. They can curb the 40 % increase in world energy
consumption expected by 2030, but it would be fanciful to
think that they could produce an overall decrease. It is
therefore vital, in parallel, to radically expand the use of
low carbon energy sources.
Low carbon energy sources
It is interesting to ask: what can replace the 14 TW (and
rising) of primary power that the world derives from fossil
fuels? The maximum additional potential of wind ?
hydro ? bio ? (enhanced) geothermal ? marine energy
appears to be no more than 6 or 7 TW [in detail: I think that
the maximum additional practical, thermal equivalent,
potentials are—wind 3 TW (35 9 2009; about half today’s
global electricity generation), hydro 2 TW (2 9 2009), bio
1 TW (2/3 of 2009), (enhanced) geothermal 1 TW
(50 9 2009), marine 0.1 TW (600 9 2009)]. We should
use as much of these sources of energy as we reasonably
can, noting that (1) their potential contributions are very
location dependent (none except wind seems to have much
potential in the GCC countries), (2) this is easier said than
done as most are currently more expensive than fossil fuels
(ignoring externalities), and wind and marine (and solar)
provide energy intermittently, and if used on a large scale
need to be backed up by other sources, or supplemented by
large scale energy storage systems which urgently need to
be developed.
The conclusion is that if/when fossil fuels become
unaffordable, or we renounce their use, solar and/or nuclear
energy, which are not included in the list above, will have
to play a major role.
Solar energy
Solar energy could in principle easily provide all the
world’s energy needs: with 15 % efficiency (which is
readily available from Photo Voltaic and Concentrated
Solar Power), 0.5 % of world’s land surface could provide
20 TW of electricity. However, although solar capacity has
grown at an average of some 40 % p.a. in the last decade,
solar today only provides less than 0.01 TW (compared to
world electricity consumption of 2.4 TW) so there is a very
long way to go. High priority should be given to driving
down costs (which is happening) and developing storage
(for use at night and when the sun is not shining: for CSP
thermal storage is appropriate, and being used; for PV
hydrogen, or hydrocarbons synthesised from H and CO2,
could be used for storage and as an energy vector). Projects
such as Desertec, which aims to supply Europe with solar
and wind energy from N Africa, will require long distance
high voltage DC transmission. The potential is of course
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large in the GCC countries, where solar energy can play a
big role as a source of energy for desalination as well as
electricity generation.
Nuclear
Nuclear and hydro are the only large-scale low-carbon
sources of energy currently in use, apart from burning bio-
mass that is renewed. However, while hydro-power could
at most be expanded by a factor of about three globally,
nuclear has a much bigger potential and in my opinion
should be expanded now.
The first examples of a new improved generation of
nuclear reactors are currently being built, but this is not
happening as rapidly as might be hoped because of con-
cerns about:
• the cost of nuclear power, which has been relatively
high in the past (although less than that of coal or gas
power if the environmental costs of burning fossil fuels
are included). The cost depends strongly on the cost of
borrowing the large sums needed to build reactors,
which is generally higher than the cost of borrowing to
invest in coal and gas plants because of the greater risks
(of changes in government policy; being undercut by
gas and coal in the future; delays in the planning
process and/or construction; and cost over-runs). On
paper,1 the new ‘generation 3’ reactors look compet-
itive with coal, but construction of the first units is
running late and going way over budget, and more
construction experience is needed to establish the real
cost.
• safety, which is mainly a problem of perception:
objectively the safety record of nuclear power is good
compared to that of almost all other major sources of
power (although there is no room for complacency);
• disposal of waste, which is technically not an issue
although reduction in the volume of waste needing
long-term storage (which is possible—see below)
would be helpful;
• proliferation, which is mainly a political issue.
Technically the rate at which nuclear power can be
expanded is limited by lack of capacity. There are rela-
tively few suppliers, and there is a need to expand the
skills-base, which has been largely lost in countries such as
the UK. At one time there were concerns about the avail-
ability of uranium, but it now seems that there is quite
probably enough to provide for ten times current use for
one hundred years at less than twice the current cost (which
today only accounts for 2–4 % of the cost of nuclear
electricity). This is long enough to further develop options
that would prolong the nuclear age and could have some
immediate benefits, including:
• re-cycling nuclear fuel (20 % more energy for a given
amount of Uranium; less waste).
• fast breeder reactors (60 times as much energy/kg U,
less waste, but more expensive, and slow to deploy—so
development should not be delayed too long): fast
breeders look promising as ‘waste burners’ to be used
in conjunction with conventional reactors.
• thorium reactors (lots of it; less waste, but fuel
fabrication much more demanding).
• fusion, which is intrinsically very attractive but
extremely demanding.
Conclusions on the global energy challenge
Dealing with the enormous challenge will need a portfolio
approach, which must include measures such as more solar,
wind, hydro, bio and marine energy wherever sensible, and
particularly: demand reduction, increased efficiency, more
nuclear power, and (if feasible, safe and economically
competitive) carbon capture and storage. In the longer
term: the world will need much more solar power,
advanced nuclear fission, and fusion power—if it can be
made to work reliably and competitively.
There is a huge R&D agenda that requires more
resources, which should be judged in comparison to the
$400 billion p.a. which is currently spent subsidising fossil
fuels (subsidies for renewables are currently about $65
billion p.a., while annual public funding of energy R&D is
about $25 billion).
Above all there is a need for the political will to make a
transition to a more energy efficient low carbon economy,
which—as well as requiring the development of new and
cheaper technologies—will have to be driven by financial
incentives (especially a high carbon price) and tougher
regulations of buildings, urban development and energy
use.
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